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The present study focuses on the accidents caused by the impact of floods on storage and process 
equipment. This type of accident is classified as a NaTech (Natural-Technological) event and resulted in 
severe consequences in several past accidents. A methodology was developed for the determination of 
vulnerability models aimed at the estimation of equipment damage probability on the basis of severity or 
intensity parameters of the flooding. A mechanical model was developed, based on the comparison 
between the flooding intensity and the resistance of a vessel and/or its support. Simplified vulnerability 
functions were derived. Finally, a case-study was set up and analysed to show the potentialities of the 
methodology and the implementation of results in quantitative risk analysis. 
1. Introduction 
In the framework of chemical and process industry, severe accidents can be triggered by the impact of 
natural events on process and storage equipment, leading to the loss of containment (LOC) of dangerous 
substances (Young at al. 2004, Cozzani et al. 2010). This type of accidents, defined as “natural-
technological” (NaTech) events, occurred several times in the past, as shown by the analysis of major 
accident databases (Krausmann et al. 2011a,b) as well as from specific studies (Cruz et al. 2006, Renni et 
al. 2010, Salzano et al. 2003, Salzano et al. 2009), often leading to catastrophic consequences. The 
recent catastrophic events occurred in Japan after the T?hoku earthquake and consequent tsunami (April 
2011) evidenced the potential severity of NaTech accidents. 
Therefore, the implementation of NaTech scenarios in the framework of Quantitative Risk Assessment 
(QRA) is a critical task, since a significant risk contribution can be associated to the occurrence of natural 
events, depending on the plant location (Cruz et al. 2006, Campedel et al. 2008, Antonioni et al. 2009). In 
order to derive the frequencies of accidental scenarios associated to NaTech events for QRA 
implementation, a critical issue is the availability of equipment fragility models. These models are aimed at 
the estimation of equipment damage probability on the basis of the severity of the natural event. Due to the 
features of a QRA study, that usually requires the assessment of a high number of scenarios, the use of 
simplified models able to yield a conservative estimation of equipment failure conditions is required to 
effectively support the assessment of equipment vulnerability (Landucci et al. 2009, Paltrinieri et al. 2009).  
The present study was devoted to the vulnerability assessment of process and storage vessels involved in 
flood events. These equipment items are the more critical units for this type of scenario according to past 
accidents data analysis (Cozzani et al. 2010). In order to evaluate the resistance of process equipment to 
flood events, a mechanical model was developed, based on the comparison between the flooding intensity 
and the resistance of a vessel. The model, validated against the available data obtained from past 
accident records, was applied in order to derive vulnerability functions for vessels involved in flooding. In 
order to explore the model features and potentialities, two case-studies were carried out, analysing an 
actual industrial layout.  
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2. Methodology 
The approach proposed to assess the vulnerability of equipment items involved in flood events is 
schematized in Table 1. The key aspect of the methodology and its implementation in Quantitative Risk 
Analysis (QRA) studies are discussed in the following. 
Table 1:  Methodology for the assessment of equipment vulnerability 
Step Description 
1 Simplified schematization of the reference equipment category 
2 Development of a model for mechanical failure under flood loads 
3 Model validation (literature data) 
4 Derivation of simplified relations for vessel damage probability 
5 Estimation of loss of containment event frequencies 
2.1 Identification of reference equipment 
From the analysis of past accidents triggered by floods (Cozzani et al. 2010), it was evidenced that 
atmospheric and pressurized storage tanks are the process items that were more frequently damaged in 
flood events. If equipment geometries are considered, the first vessel type consists in a vertical cylinder 
with fixed or floating roof operating at atmospheric pressure. If relevant storage capacities are considered 
(above 10t and/or 10m3), a flat bottom directly fixed to the ground with a dap joint is usually present. This 
type of vessel is mainly used for liquid storage (See Figure 1a). The second type of vessel features a 
cylindrical shape with hemispherical or ellipsoidal bottoms. Usually such vessels are horizontally disposed 
on saddles or other support types. In the present study, the vessels were considered completely blocked 
on one edge, while on the other a free slip was present on the vessel axis as schematized in Figure 1b. 
This solution is often employed in order to avoid stress increase due to thermal dilatation. 
Table 2:  Reference vessel geometries considered in the present study. See Figure 1 for vessel sketch 
and parameters identification.  
Vessel type Vessel class D (m) H (m) t (mm) Capacity (m3) S (m) Pcr (Pa, see Eq.6)
Atmospheric Small capacity 3-42 3.6–18 5–12.5 < 5000 - 6932–19285 
 Medium capacity 21-54 3.6–16.2 12.5 5000 – 10000    - 5180–11171 
 Large capacity 48-66 3.6-7.2 12.5-15 >10000 - 4361-12666 
Pressurized Small capacity 1.3-1.6   3.0-3.5 11-14 <10 0.98 - 
 Medium capacity 1.6-2.4 4.5-11.1 14-20 10-30 0.98-1.38 - 
 Large capacity 2.5-3.8 8.0-24.0 21-32 >30 1.38-1.98 - 
 
a) b)
D
?
H
t Pw hwPf
vw
N
W
S
H
D
t hw
?
 
Figure 1: Schematization of a) atmospheric vertical tanks and b) horizontal pressurized tanks. 
Table 2 reports the features of the vessels considered in the present study. A specific vessel database 
was built (Landucci et al. 2012). Vessel geometries were obtained from typical design data used by 
engineering companies in the chemical and process industry. The design data of the atmospheric tanks 
were based on API 650 standards, while the volumes and diameters were based on data from several oil 
refineries. In the case of pressurized vessels, the volumes and diameters were derived from vessels 
typically used for LPG, vinyl chloride, chlorine and ammonia pressurized storages. Cylindrical vessels with 
horizontal axis and design pressures between 1.5 and 2.5 MPa were considered. The design data were 
verified with respect to section VIII of the ASME codes. 
2.2 Mechanical model set up 
Figure 1a schematizes the forces acting on the atmospheric vessels when impacted by a flood wave. The 
external load present on the tank shell, namely Pw, is obtained as the sum of a “static” pressure 
component Pws and of a “dynamic” pressure component Pwd: 
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where hw and vw are respectively the flooding height and velocity, g is the gravity constant (9.81 m/s2), ?w 
is the density of the floodwater and kw is the hydrodynamic coefficient (Gudmestad and Moe 1996). The 
static pressure component Pws is due to the hydrostatic load of the floodwater, while the dynamic 
component is due to the drag force associated to the kinetic energy of the wave. For the sake of simplicity, 
a constant temperature of 293 K and an atmospheric pressure of 1.01 bar were assumed in the present 
study, thus considering constant the fluid properties in the above relations. 
The internal pressure of the tank, Pf, related to the hydrostatic pressure of the internal liquid hold up, has 
an important role in the evaluation of the resistance of the tank to flood external pressure, as shown in 
Figure 1. The maximum Pf value, at the bottom of the vessel, may be expressed as follows: 
?? HgP ff ?    (2) 
where ?f  is the density of the inner fluid, H is the height of the tank and ? is the filling level. Therefore, the 
net pressure Pnet on the vessel shell may be derived from a simple force balance: 
fwdwsnet PPPP ???    (3) 
The external Pnet acting on the vessel may cause the structural integrity loss by buckling. This 
phenomenon is described in detail in the literature (Timoshenko and Gere 1961) and typically affects 
atmospheric vessels. According to Timoshenko and Gere (1961), buckling may occur if the Pnet reaches a 
critical value, indicated in the following as Pcr (critical pressure). Pcr depends only on the vessel geometry 
and on the construction material, and is independent from the loading conditions. Pcr may be calculated by 
the following expression: 
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In which E and ? are respectively the elastic modulus and Poisson’s ratio of the construction material, t 
and D the vessel thickness and diameter and n is an integer number which minimizes Pcr. Therefore, given 
a set of vessels of interest, the Pcr is evaluated and compared with the Pnet, which results from different 
flooding and storage/processing conditions. If Pnet is higher than Pcr the failure for instability of atmospheric 
vessels is hence predicted by the model. 
The same type of approach was extended in order to set up the mechanical model for horizontal cylindrical 
vessels, which schematization is reported in Figure 1b. In this case, the possibility of having a rupture 
following the flood event is related to the resistance of the connection between the vessel framework (e.g., 
saddle or other support structures) and the ground. As reported in the results of past accident data 
analysis (Cozzani et al. 2010), the rupture of the framework may cause the displacement of the vessel, 
with the consequent rupture of the vessel connections and potential impact with adjacent units or 
structures. Hence, the possibility of having a LOC following a flood impact is directly related to the integrity 
of the framework connection to the ground. The connection is subjected to the lift force due to floating 
action of the floodwater and, on the same time, by the shear action due to the flood wave drag force. For 
preliminary evaluations, only the flood lift force was considered in the present study (marked with N in 
Figure 1b). Hence, if this force is higher than the whole structure weight (marked with W in Figure 1b), thus 
including both steelwork and inner fluid weight, the failure occurs. This evaluation is on the safe side and 
may be expressed as follows: 
? ? intfintextsextww gVVVgVg)S,H,D,h(WN ????? ?????    (5) 
where Vint and Vext are respectively the inner and outer volume of the vessel, ?s the density of the 
construction material, and ? is the fraction of the total volume submerged by the flooding. This latter 
parameter depends on the flood height (hw), but also on the vessel geometry (diameter D and length H) 
and framework height (S) as expressed by the geometrical relationships summarized in Table 3. Finally, 
Table 4 summarizes the parameters selected for the present study. The critical pressure of the 
atmospheric vessels (Pcr) is reported in Table 2 for the database vessels. More details on the mechanical 
model set-up are reported elsewhere (Landucci et al. 2012). 
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Table 3:  Definition of the submerged fraction of a horizontal cylindrical vessel.  
ID Equation Parameters definition 
(a) h = min[(hw-(S-R));D] h = Geometrical parameter; R = D/2 
(b) Vsub = min[H(0.5?R2+R2arcsin((h-R)/R)+(h-R)(2hR-h2)0.5);Vext] Vsub =Submerged vessel volume 
(c) ? = Vsub / Vext Submerged vessel fraction 
Table4:  Values of parameters assumed as constant in the present study.  
Parameter Value Units Source 
E 2.1x1011 Pa American Society of Mechanical Engineering codes 
kw 1.8 - Gudmestad and Moe 1996 
?? 0.3 - American Society of Mechanical Engineering codes 
?f 1000* kg/m3 American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 650 
?s 7800 kg/m3 American Society of Mechanical Engineering codes 
?w 1100 kg/m3 Gudmestad and Moe 1996 
* Assumed for model validation 
2.3 Model validation 
Data on flood damage to equipment items are scarce and not detailed, often providing only qualitative 
information (Young et al. 2004,Cozzani et al. 2010, Krausmann et al. 2011a,b). Hence, in order to validate 
the model, a damage threshold was derived from a previous study based on an extended past accident 
analysis (Rijkswaterstaat 2005, Landucci et al. 2012). The damage threshold was estimated as the value 
of external pressure Pw below which vessel damage and/or loss of containment was never reported in past 
accidents. This resulted equal to 9.4 kPa, associated to a flood wave with a velocity of 2 m/s and a 
maximum height of 0.5 m. Failure model predictions may be validated comparing the resistance of the 
vessels considered in the database (see Table 2) with respect to the damage threshold considered. 
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Figure 2: Results of the validation for atmospheric vessels: fraction of the tanks able to withstand the 
reference flood impact as a function of the filling level.  
Figure 2 shows the fraction (%) of atmospheric vessels able to withstand the reference flooding conditions. 
Most of the vessels (more than 65%) do not fail even when empty. When different liquid levels are 
considered, the results evidence that all the vessels are able to withstand the reference flooding conditions 
when filling level is higher than 10%. In the case of pressurized vessels, the reference flooding condition 
leads to negligible damages to the framework, thus no damage is predicted by the model even in the case 
of empty tanks. Therefore, the validation evidenced that failure conditions predicted by the model are in 
sufficient agreement with the available literature data. 
2.4 Evaluation of vessels vulnerability and damage frequency 
In Section 2.3 it was evidenced that the filling level is the key operating parameter for the definition of the 
tank resistance to a given flood scenario. Hence, in order to estimate the probability of possible vessel 
damage, i.e., the vessel vulnerability to a flood, the introduction of a “critical filling level” (CFL) may be 
used as a reference. The CFL may be defined as the minimum residual filling level able to increase the 
inner vessel pressure or weight in order to withstand the flood. As suggested by Landucci et al. (2012), in 
the case of atmospheric vessels the CFL may be expressed modifying eq.(3) and the terms defined in 
Eqs. (1) and (2) obtaining the following expression: 
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Similar considerations can be introduced for pressurized vessels, recombining eq.(5) as follows: 
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According to its definition, the CFL delimits the “safe” operating conditions for a selected vessel (either 
atmospheric or pressurized) given the flood parameters, vw and hw. If the filling level is lower than the CFL, 
the tank is in the “unsafe” zone since the vessel is not able to resist to the external pressure. On the basis 
of these considerations, the vessels damage probability ? is derived by the ratio between the “unsafe” 
operative conditions with respect to all the possible operative conditions: 
minmax
minCFL
??
?? ?
??
   (8) 
In the present approach, for the sake of simplicity, a linear distribution of possible operative filling levels 
between ?min (=1%) and ?max (=75%) is assumed in the definition of ?. Nevertheless, more specific data, 
when available, may be introduced in eq. (8) to obtain an equipment-specific vulnerability model. 
Once evaluated the damage probability ??associated to the flood event with fixed intensity (vw;hw) for each 
vessel, frequency fLOC (1/y) associated to the damage induced by flooding may be calculated  multiplying 
the damage probability, ???by the frequency, of the occurrence of the considered flood event, f (1/y). 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1 Definition of the case studies 
In order to test the potential of the methodology in a typical QRA framework, a vulnerability analysis of a 
tank farm (Figure 3) was carried out to assess the expected damage probability and the associated 
hazardous materials release frequencies (fLOC) caused by severe flood conditions. Figure 3 summarizes 
the features of the vessels analysed and reports the densities of the stored substances. Two reference 
flooding scenarios were considered: 
  - Case study A: flood velocity vw,A= 2 m/s and height hw,A = 0.5 m with expected frequency of 4x10-3 1/y. 
  - Case study B: flood velocity vw,B= 0.5 m/s and height hw,B = 2 m with expected frequency of 2x10-3 1/y. 
In both case studies, the values of flood frequency were derived from site specific data obtained by local 
authorities. Specific models are available in the literature for these parameters (Rijkswaterstaat 2005).  
3.2 Vessels vulnerability and failure frequencies 
Table 5 reports the vulnerability values obtained for the tanks applying the CFL approach. In the case of 
high velocity flooding with limited water height (e.g., case study A) lower values of ? are obtained, while in 
the case of more severe flooding with high water depth (e.g., case study B), all the tank farm is subjected 
to severe damages. The atmospheric tanks with higher capacity are less resistant with respect to the 
smaller ones, due to the lower values of critical pressure (Pcr, see Eq.4 and Table 2). It is worth to remark 
that these less resistant vessels are also featured by higher inventories of hazardous materials, thus 
damage is likely to result in more severe accident scenarios. The pressurized vessels are not affected by 
limited depth waves since they are usually supported at a higher height with respect to the ground (see 
Figure 1). Nevertheless a high vulnerability is expected in case of high depth flooding. Table 5 shows also 
the evaluated LOC frequencies calculated for each tank on the basis of vulnerability assessment for the 
two case studies (fLOC,A and fLOC,B). As shown in Table 5, LOC frequency values range between 4×10-6 and 
2×10-3 1/y. It should be remarked that LOC events due to internal failure causes usually have comparable 
or even lower frequencies (Uijt de Haag and Ale 1999), confirming that in flood-prone zones, NaTech 
scenarios triggered by floods may have potentially a significant impact on the risk profile of an installation. 
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AT13
AT14 AT16
AT19
AT18
AT17
AT15
AT20-AT21
N
Atmospheric tanks C (m3) D (m) H (m) t (mm) Pcr (Pa) ?f (kg/m3)
AT1,AT2 12361 54 5.4 12.5 5221.3 950
AT3-AT6 8241 54 3.6 12.5 11171 750
AT7,AT8 4120 18 16.2 12.5 7815.3 900
AT9-AT12 7630 30 10.8 12.5 5563.7 650
AT13,AT14 12361 54 5.4 12.5 5221.3 750
AT15,AT16 4120 18 16.2 12.5 7815.3 1100
AT18,AT19 12361 54 5.4 12.5 5221.3 850
AT17,AT20,AT21 5087 30 7.2 12.5 8603.3 750
Pressurized tanks C (m3) D (m) H (m) t (mm) V (m) ?f (kg/m3)
P1-P8 100 2.8 18 24 1.58 500  
Figure 3: Layout of the case study considered. The panel shows the characteristics of the vessels 
considered and stored fluid density. Pcr is evaluated by Eq.4. See Figure 1 for parameter definition. 
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Table 5: Results of the case study: vessels vulnerability (?? %) and expected failure frequency (fLOC, 1/y) 
as a function of the critical filling level (CFL in %).  
Vessel ID Case study A Case study B 
 CFL (%) ? (%) fLOC (1/y) CFL (%) ? (%) fLOC (1/y) 
AT1,AT2 8.2 9.8 3.9x10-4 33 43 8.7x10-4 
AT3-AT6 1.0 0 - 40 53 1.1x10-3 
AT7,AT8 1.1 0.1 4.2x10-6 10 12 2.4x10-4 
AT9-AT12 5.5 6.1 2.4x10-4 24 31 6.1x10-4 
AT13,AT14 10.4 13 5.1x10-4 42 55 1.1x10-3 
AT15,AT16 1.0 0 - 8 9 1.9x10-4 
AT18,AT19 9.2 11 4.4x10-4 37 48 9.7x10-4 
AT17,AT20,AT21 1.4 1 2.3x10-5 25 32 6.5x10-4 
P1-P8 0.0 0 - 51 61 1.4x10-3 
4. Conclusions 
A model was developed to calculate the damage probability of atmospheric and pressurized vessels in 
flood events. The modelling approach was validated against available literature data and allowed the 
identification of the more critical parameters affecting vessel resistance to floods. Model application to 
case-studies confirmed that NaTech scenarios caused by floods may significantly affect the risk profile of 
industrial facilities. 
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